Subject: CVE-2024-43891: tracing: Have format file honor EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email-masked]>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Have format file honor EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED

When eventfs was introduced, special care had to be done to coordinate the
freeing of the file meta data with the files that are exposed to user
space. The file meta data would have a ref count that is set when the file
is created and would be decremented and freed after the last user that
opened the file closed it. When the file meta data was to be freed, it
would set a flag (EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED) to denote that the file is freed,
and any new references made (like new opens or reads) would fail as it is
marked freed. This allowed other meta data to be freed after this flag was
set (under the event_mutex).

All the files that were dynamically created in the events directory had a
pointer to the file meta data and would call event_release() when the last
reference to the user space file was closed. This would be the time that it
is safe to free the file meta data.

A shortcut was made for the "format" file. It's i_private would point to
the "call" entry directly and not point to the file's meta data. This is
because all format files are the same for the same "call", so it was
thought there was no reason to differentiate them.  The other files
maintain state (like the "enable", "trigger", etc). But this meant if the
file were to disappear, the "format" file would be unaware of it.

This caused a race that could be trigger via the user_events test (that
would create dynamic events and free them), and running a loop that would
read the user_events format files:

In one console run:

 # cd tools/testing/selftests/user_events
 # while true; do ./ftrace_test; done

And in another console run:

 # cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
 # while true; do cat events/user_events/__test_event/format; done 2>/dev/null

With KASAN memory checking, it would trigger a use-after-free bug report
(which was a real bug). This was because the format file was not checking
the file's meta data flag "EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED", so it would access the
event that the file meta data pointed to after the event was freed.

After inspection, there are other locations that were found to not check
the EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag when accessing the trace_event_file. Add a
new helper function: event_file_file() that will make sure that the
event_mutex is held, and will return NULL if the trace_event_file has the
EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag set. Have the first reference of the struct file
pointer use event_file_file() and check for NULL. Later uses can still use
the event_file_data() helper function if the event_mutex is still held and
was not released since the event_file_file() call.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-43891 to this issue.

Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 6.6.33 with commit 14aa4f3efc6e and fixed in 6.6.49 with commit 4ed03758ddf0
	Issue introduced in 6.9 with commit b63db58e2fa5 and fixed in 6.10.5 with commit 531dc6780d94
	Issue introduced in 6.9 with commit b63db58e2fa5 and fixed in 6.11 with commit b1560408692c

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2024-43891
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.

Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	kernel/trace/trace.h
	kernel/trace/trace_events.c
	kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
	kernel/trace/trace_events_inject.c
	kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c

Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ed03758ddf0b19d69eed69386d65a92d0091e0c
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/531dc6780d94245af037c25c2371c8caf652f0f9
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1560408692cd0ab0370cfbe9deb03ce97ab3f6d