



PKCS #15 v1.0 Amendment 1 Draft #1

RSA Laboratories

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Editor’s note: This is the first draft of this amendment, which is available for a 30-day public review period. Please send comments and suggestions, both technical and editorial, to pkcs-editor@rsasecurity.com or pkcs-tng@rsasecurity.com.

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1. Introduction

In certain circumstances, there is a need to make a PKCS #15-library aware of the fact that a user has to re-authenticate after accessing a private object, e.g. a private key, a certain number of times. This amendment documents the changes to PKCS #15 v1.0 needed to support this.

2. Changes to Section 7, “Information Syntax in ASN.1”

[Replace the ASN.1 definition of PKCS15CommonObjectAttributes in Section 7.1.7 with:]

```

PKCS15CommonObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    label PKCS15Label OPTIONAL,
    flags PKCS15CommonObjectFlags OPTIONAL,
    authId PKCS15Identifier OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    userConsent [0] INTEGER (1..pkcs15-ub-userConsent) OPTIONAL

```

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```

} (CONSTRAINED BY {-- authId should be present in the IC card
-- case if flags.private is set. It must equal an
-- authID in one AuthRecord in the AODF. userConsent may only be present if
-- flags.private is set. -- })
    
```

[Add the following paragraph after the currently last paragraph in Section 7.1.7:]

The `userConsent` field gives, in the case of a private object, the number of times an application may access the object without explicit consent from the user (e.g. a value of **3** indicates that a new authentication will be required before the first, the 4th, the 7th, etc. access).

3. Changes to Section 8, “ASN.1 Module”

[Add the following definition after the definition of `pkcs15-ub-recordLength`:]

```

pkcs15-ub-userConsent INTEGER ::= 15
    
```

[Replace the ASN.1 definition of `PKCS15CommonObjectAttributes` with:]

```

PKCS15CommonObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    label PKCS15Label OPTIONAL,
    flags PKCS15CommonObjectFlags OPTIONAL,
    authId PKCS15Identifier OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    userConsent INTEGER (1..pkcs15-ub-userConsent) OPTIONAL
} (CONSTRAINED BY {-- authId should be present in the IC card
-- case if flags.private is set. It must equal an
-- authID in one AuthRecord in the AODF. userConsent may only be present if
-- flags.private is set. -- })
    
```

A. Intellectual property considerations

RSA Security makes no patent claims on the general constructions described in this document, although specific underlying techniques may be covered.

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B. References

- [1] RSA Laboratories. *PKCS #15: Cryptographic Token Information Format Standard*. Version 1.0, April 1999.

C. About PKCS

The *Public-Key Cryptography Standards* are specifications produced by RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems developers worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of public-key cryptography. First published in 1991 as a result of meetings with a small group of early adopters of public-key technology, the PKCS documents have become widely referenced and implemented. Contributions from the PKCS series have become part of many formal and *de facto* standards, including ANSI X9 documents, PKIX, SET, S/MIME, and SSL.

Further development of PKCS occurs through mailing list discussions and occasional workshops, and suggestions for improvement are welcome. For more information, contact:

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